Cruzan after Dobbs: What Remains of the Constitutional Right to Refuse Treatment?

In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court removed constitutional protection from the individual's right to end a pregnancy. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, the Court invalidated previous rulings protecting that right as part of the individual liberty and privacy interests embedded in the U.S. Constitution. Now, many observers are speculating about the fate of other rights founded on those interests. The Dobbs ruling conflicts with the Court's 1990 Cruzan decision restricting the government's power to interfere with personal medical choices. The language and reasoning in Dobbs and Cruzan offer guidance on how the Court might address future cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The decisions also point to policy strategies for preserving that right.

Life-Sustaining Treatment States in Korean Cancer Patients after Enforcement of Act on Decisions on Life-Sustaining Treatment for Patients at the End of Life.

PURPOSE: In Korea, the "Act on Hospice and Palliative Care and Decisions on Life-sustaining Treatment for Patients at the End of Life" was enacted on February 4, 2018. This study was conducted to analyze the current state of life-sustaining treatment decisions based on National Health Insurance Service (NHIS) data after the law came into force. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The data of 173,028 cancer deaths were extracted from NHIS qualification data between November 2015 and January 2019. RESULTS: The number of cancer deaths complied with the law process was 14,438 of 54,635 cases (26.4%). The rate of patient self-determination was 49.0%. The patients complying with the law process have used a hospice center more frequently (28% vs. 14%). However, the rate of intensive care unit (ICU) admission was similar between the patients who complied with and without the law process (ICU admission, 23% vs. 21%). There was no difference in the proportion of patients who had undergone mechanical ventilation and hemodialysis in the comparative analysis before and after the enforcement of the law and the analysis according to the compliance with the law. The patients who complied with the law process received cardiopulmonary resuscitation at a lower rate. CONCLUSION: The law has positive effects on the rate of life-sustaining treatment decision by patient's determination. However, there was no sufficient effect on the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment, which could protect the patient from unnecessary or harmful interventions.

Preparation and Practice of the Necessary Documents in Hospital for the "Act on Decision of Life-Sustaining Treatment for Patients at the End-of-Life".

PURPOSE: Six forms relating to decisions on life-sustaining treatment (LST) for patients at the end-of-life (EOL) in hospital are required by the "Act on Decision of LST for Patients at the EOL." We investigated the preparation and creation status of these documents from the database of the National Agency for Management of LST. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We analyzed the contents and details of each document necessary for decisions on LST, and the creation status of forms. We defined patients completing form 1 as "self-determined" of LST, and those whose family members had completed form 11/12 as "family decision" of LST. According to the determination subject, we compared the four items of LST on form 13 (the paper of implementation of LST) and the documentation time interval between forms. RESULTS: The six forms require information about the patient, doctor, specialized doctor, family members, institution, decision for LST, and intention to use hospice services. Of 44,381 who had completed at least one document, 36,693 patients had form 13. Among them, 11,531, 10,976, and 12,551 people completed forms 1, 11, and 12, respectively. The documentation time interval from forms 1, 11, or 12 to form 13 was 8.6±13.6 days, 1.0±9.5 days, and 1.5±9.7 days, respectively. CONCLUSION: The self-determination rate of LST was 31% and the mean time interval from self-determination to implementation of LST was 8.6 days. The creation of these forms still takes place when the patients are close to death.

Current Status and Cardinal Features of Patient Autonomy after Enactment of the Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions Act in Korea.

PURPOSE: The main purpose of the Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions Act recently enacted in Korea is to respect the patient's self-determination. We aimed to investigate the current status and features of patient self-determination after implementation of the law. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Between February 2018 and January 2019, 54,635 cancer deaths were identified from the National Health Insurance Service (NHIS) database. We analyzed the characteristics of decedents who complied with the law process by self-determination compared with decedents with family determination and with decedents who did not comply with the law process. RESULTS: In multivariable analysis, patients with self-determination were younger, were less likely to live in rural areas, were less likely to belong to the highest income quintile, were less likely to be treated in general hospitals, and were more likely to show a longer time from cancer diagnosis compared with patients with family determination. Compared with patients who did not comply with the law process, patients with self-determination were younger, lived in Seoul or capital area, were less likely to belong to the highest income quintile, were treated in general hospitals, were less likely to have genitourinary or hematologic malignancies, scored higher on the Charlson comorbidity index, and showed a longer time from cancer diagnosis. Patients with self-determination were more likely to use hospice and less likely to use intensive care units (ICUs) at the end-of-life (EOL). CONCLUSION: Decedents with self-determination were more likely to be younger, reside in the Seoul or capital area, show a longer time from cancer diagnosis, and were less likely to belong to the highest income quintile. They utilized hospice more frequently, and received less ICU care at the EOL.

The Situation of Life-Sustaining Treatment One Year after Enforcement of the Act on Decisions on Life-Sustaining Treatment for Patients at the End-of-Life in Korea: Data of National Agency for Management of Life-Sustaining Treatment.

PURPOSE: The "Act on Hospice and Palliative Care and Decisions on Life-Sustaining Treatment for Patients at the End-of-Life" was enacted on February 3, 2016 and went into effect on February 4, 2018 in Korea. This study reviewed the first year of determination to life-sustaining treatment (LST) through data analysis of the National Agency for Management of Life-Sustaining Treatment. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The National Agency for Management of LST provided data between February 4, 2018 and January 31, 2019 anonymously from 33,549 patients. According to the forms patients were defined as either elf-determinants or family-determinants. RESULTS: The median age of the patient was 73 and the majority was male (59.9%). Cancer patients were 59% and self-determinants were 32.1%. Cancer patients had a higher rate of self-determinants than non-cancer (47.3% vs. 10.1%). Plan for hospice service was high in cancer patients among self-determinants (81.0% vs. 37.5%, p < 0.001). In comparison to family-determinants, self-determinants were younger (median age, 67 years vs. 75 years; p < 0.001) and had more cancer diagnosis (87.1% vs. 45.9%, p < 0.001). Decision of withholding or withdrawing of LSTs in cancer patients was higher than non-cancer patients in four items. CONCLUSION: Cancer patients had a higher rate in self-determination and withholding or withdrawing of LSTs than non-cancer patients. Continued revision of the law and education of the public will be able to promote withdrawing or withholding the futile LSTs in patients at end-of-life. Further study following the revision of the law should be evaluated to change of end-of-life care.

[Withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments in acute oncology situations: History and regulatory aspects in France]. / La « Limitation et/ou arrêt des thérapeutiques ¼ (LAT) en oncologie face à une situation aigüe : historique et aspects réglementaires en France.

The management of oncology patients, especially hospitalized patients, can lead to almost daily discussions regarding therapeutic limitations. Here, we review the history and propose a summary of the texts framing the notion of "withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment" in oncology practice in France. This decision is regulated by the Claeys-Léonetti Law of February 2, 2016 recommending a collegial discussion and its documentation in the medical record. The decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments is the subject of discussion between the patient, his physicians and his family and may take place at any time during his management. The work of intensive-care physicians provides many useful recommendations for acute oncology situations, however articles specific for oncology practice are scarce; this is a topic that oncologists must take up.

The Discourse of Dignity in the Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and Isaiah Haastrup Cases.

There are competing accounts of dignity and no agreement about how to adjudicate between them, but this does not prevent dignity from playing an important role in the law. In fact, this very multiplicity enables dignity to perform a range of functions, both explicit and implicit, intended and unintended. Its 'open character' allows dignity to serve as a locus of agreement, but it can also silence debate and limit speaker control of how their statements are received and interpreted. This paper considers dignity's roles in recent English court judgments relating to withdrawal of ventilation and associated care from three unresponsive, paralysed infants: Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans, and Isaiah Haastrup. It presents a critical discourse analysis focusing on the judgments of first instance in relation to these infants. It argues that a range of conceptions of dignity are operationalised, serving four functions: to express esteem; to establish a hierarchy of credibility; to justify a best interests judgment, and to socialise that judgment. The overall effect is that dignity serves to compel acceptance of, rather than providing reasons to support, a best interests judgment. While recognising the value of unspecified invocations of dignity, we voice a warning about its potential to stifle debate and legitimise and enforce existing power relations.

Why Tolerate Conscientious Objections in Medicine.

Most arguments about conscientious objections in medicine fail to capture the full scope and complexity of the concept before drawing conclusions about their permissibility in practice. Arguments favoring and disfavoring the accommodation of conscientious objections in practice tend to focus too narrowly on prima facie morally contentious treatments and religious claims of conscience, while further failing to address the possibility of moral perspectives changing over time. In this paper, I argue that standard reasons against permitting conscientious objections in practice-that their permission may result in harm to patients, the idea that medical providers willingly enter into the medical field, and that conscientious objections stand contrary to medical professionalism-do not apply in all cases and that the medical field and health systems in which many physicians now practice should continue to tolerate conscientious objections in practice.

Resolving Disagreement: A Multi-Jurisdictional Comparative Analysis of Disputes About Children's Medical Care.

Recently, the English courts have dealt with a number high-profile, emotive disputes over the care of very ill children, including Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans, and Tafida Raqeeb. It is perhaps fair to say such cases have become a regular feature of the courts in England. But is the situation similar in other jurisdictions? If not, are there lessons to be learned from these jurisdictions that do not seem to need to call on judges to resolve these otherwise intractable disputes? We argue that many of the differences we see between jurisdictions derive from cultural and social differences manifesting in both the legal rules in place, and how the various parties interact with, and defer to, one another. We further argue that while recourse to the courts is undesirable in many ways, it is also indicative of a society that permits difference of views and provides for these differences to be considered in a public manner following clear procedural and precedential rules. These are the hallmarks of a liberal democracy that allows for pluralism of values, while still remaining committed to protecting the most vulnerable parties in these disputes-children facing life-limiting conditions.

Discussing deactivation of implantable cardiac defibrillators.

Implantable cardiac defibrillators are a key component in preventing sudden cardiac death for patients with life-threatening arrhythmias. Through ageing, frailty and the progression of cardiac and non-cardiac morbidity, many will develop a 'life-limiting' condition. This raises the challenge of how to approach making decisions to deactivate the defibrillator function. This article discusses the background to deactivation of implantable cardioverter defibrillators and the practical considerations for different circumstances.

"The Hopkins Mongol Case": The Dawn of the Bioethics Movement.

One of the earliest controversies in the modern history of bioethics was known at the time as "the Hopkins Mongol case," involving an infant with Trisomy 21 and duodenal atresia whose parents declined to consent to surgery. Fluids and feeding were withheld, and the infant died of dehydration after 15 days. The child's short life had a profound impact on the author's career and that of several others and ultimately led to changes in the care of children and adults with disabilities and the way difficult end-of-life decisions are made in US hospitals today. It also contributed to the growth of the modern bioethics movement and scholarship focused on pediatric bioethics issues.

Who Is the Next "Baby Doe?" From Trisomy 21 to Trisomy 13 and 18 and Beyond.

The "Baby Doe" case of the early 1980s was marked by considerable controversy, primarily regarding the legal response of the federal government to the case at the time. In the decades that followed, the decision-making for children with trisomy 21, like Baby Doe, has been substantially reevaluated. The data, the assumptions about quality of life that were based on those data, and the ethical principles underpinning the decision-making in the Baby Doe case have all evolved significantly over time. The present strategies for decision-making for children with trisomy 13 and 18 appear to be following a similar pattern. The data, quality-of-life assumptions based on those data, and even the ethical principles underlying the decision-making for these children are currently being reexamined. Children with trisomy 13 and 18 are, in this regard, the next Baby Doe(s).

The Charlie Gard Case, and the Ethics of Obstructing International Transfer of Seriously Ill Children.

In 2017, the court case over medical treatment of UK infant, Charlie Gard, reached global attention. In this article, I will analyze one of the more distinctive elements of the case. The UK courts concluded that treatment of Charlie Gard was not in his best interests and that it would be permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. However, in addition, the court ruled that Charlie should not be transferred overseas for the treatment that his parents sought, even though specialists in Italy and the US were willing to provide that treatment. Is it ethical to prevent parents from pursuing life-prolonging treatment overseas for their children? If so, when is it ethical to do this? I will outline arguments in defense of obstructing transfer in some situations. I will argue, however, that this is only justified if there is good reason to think that the proposed treatment would cause harm.

Reflections on Charlie Gard and the Best Interests Standard From Both Sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Charlie Gard (August 4, 2016, to July 28, 2017) was an infant in the United Kingdom who was diagnosed with an encephalopathic form of mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome caused by a mutation in the RRM2B gene. Charlie's parents raised £1.3 million (∼$1.6 million US) on a crowdfunding platform to travel to New York to pursue experimental nucleoside bypass treatment, which was being used to treat a myopathic form of mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome caused by mutations in a different gene (TK2). The case made international headlines about what was in Charlie's best interest. In the medical ethics community, it raised the question of whether best interest serves as a guidance principle (a principle that provides substantive directions as to how decisions are to be made), an intervention principle (a principle specifying the conditions under which third parties are to intervene), both guidance and intervention, or neither. I show that the United Kingdom uses best interest as both guidance and intervention, and the United States uses best interest for neither. This explains why the decision to withdraw the ventilator without attempting nucleoside bypass treatment was the correct decision in the United Kingdom and why the opposite conclusion would have been reached in the United States.

The Suffering Child: Claims of Suffering in Seminal Cases and What To Do About Them.

In all of medicine, there is perhaps nothing so distressing as bearing witness to a patient's suffering, especially if that patient is a child. We want to do everything that we can to avoid or alleviate a child's suffering, yet what do clinicians, ethicists, lawyers, or family members mean when they use the term "suffering," and how should these claims of suffering factor into pediatric decision-making? This question of suffering and what to do about it has played a key role in several prominent pediatric cases over the past decade, including the cases of Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans, and Baby Joseph. These cases have become seminal cases precisely because there is no clear resolution, and the "suffering child" continues to challenge our moral ideals of what it means to live a good life. In this article, I explore the various ways in which the concept of suffering is used in these cases, and I offer new ways in which parents, providers, and all those who work with sick children can approach the suffering child.

The Islamic perspective on physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia.

Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia can be debated from ethical and legal perspectives, and there are a variety of views regarding their acceptability and usefulness. Religion is considered an important factor in determining attitudes towards such practices. This narrative review aims to provide an overview of the Islamic perspective on PAS and euthanasia and explore the Islamic approach in addressing the related issues. The PubMed database was searched to retrieve relevant articles, then the references listed in the selected articles were checked for additional relevant publications. Additionally, religious books (Quran and hadith) and legal codes of selected countries were also consulted from appropriate websites. The Islamic code of law discusses many issues regarding life and death, as it considers any act of taking one's life to be forbidden. Islam sanctifies life and depicts it as a gift from God (Allah). It consistently emphasises the importance of preserving life and well-being. Therefore Muslims, the followers of Islam, have no right to end their life. All Islamic doctrines consider PAS and euthanasia to be forbidden. However, if the patient has an imminently fatal illness, withholding or withdrawing a futile medical treatment is considered permissible. From a legal perspective, Islamic countries have not legalised PAS and euthanasia. Such practices are therefore considered suicides when patients consent to the procedure, and homicides when physicians execute the procedure.

Una propuesta conceptual del criterio del mejor interés / A conceptual proposal of the Best Interest Criterion / Una proposta conceptual del criteri de millor interés

El objetivo de este artículo es definir y clarificar el criterio del mejor interés (CMI) como un principio ético para la toma de decisiones por representación. En primer lugar, se exponen algunas propuestas conceptuales como la de Kopelman y Buchanan y Brock. En segundo lugar, analizamos algunas críticas que se han hecho al CMI. Por último, este trabajo responde algunas críticas y hace una propuesta integradora

The aim of this paper defines and clarifies the best interest criterion (BIC) as an ethical principle to substitute decision-making. First, this work exposes some conceptual proposals such as Kopelman and Buchanan and Brock. Second, the authors analyze some criticisms that have been made to BIC. Third, we want to respond such critics and we do a conciliatory proposal

L'objectiu d'aquest article és definir I clarificar el criteri del millor interès (CMI) com un principi ètic per a la presa de decisions per representació. En primer lloc, s'exposen algunes propostes conceptuals com la de Kopelman I Buchanan I Brock. En segon lloc, analitzem algunes crítiques que s'han fet al CMI. Finalment, aquest treball dóna resposta a algunes crítiques I fa una proposta integradora

Conceptions of dignity in the Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and Isaiah Haastrup cases.

In 2017 and 2018, the English courts were asked to decide whether continued life-sustaining treatment was in the best interests of three infants: Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and Isaiah Haastrup. Each infant had sustained catastrophic, irrecoverable brain damage. Dignity played an important role in the best interests assessments reached by the Family division of the High Court in each case. Multiple conceptions of dignity circulate, with potentially conflicting implications for infants such as Charlie, Alfie and Isaiah. The judgements do not explicate the conceptions of dignity upon which they rely. This article reconstructs the conceptions of dignity invoked in these judgements, finding that a broadly Kantian, agential conception dominates, under which human dignity requires the prospect of agency. This conception is situated within the broader body of thought on dignity, and the potentially adverse implications of applying the reconstructed conception in best interests assessments for infants with severely restricted consciousness are discussed.

The BMA COVID-19 ethical guidance: a legal analysis.

The paper considers the recently published British Medical Association Guidance on ethical issues arising in relation to rationing of treatment during the COVID-19 Pandemic. It considers whether it is lawful to create policies for the rationing and withdrawal of treatment, and goes on to consider how such policies might apply in practice. Legal analysis is undertaken of certain aspects of the Guidance which appear to misunderstand the law in respect of withdrawing treatment.